The crash of Austerity economics : Reality keeps contradicting the sponsors of economic pain, but they keep dispensing their perverse advice. by Mason, J. W. & Jayadev, Arjun
10/10/2019 The Crash of Austerity Economics - The American Prospect
https://prospect.org/culture/books/the-crash-of-austerity-economics/ 1/10
  
Donate Subscribe 
Home / Books, Arts and Culture / Books /
  
The Crash of Austerity
Economics
Reality keeps contradicting the sponsors of economic pain,
but they keep dispensing their perverse advice.
BY J.W. MASON, ARJUN JAYADEV  OCTOBER 8, 2019
THANASSIS STAVRAKIS/AP PHOTO
In a formerly busy Athens shopping arcade, closed stores are padlocked
against a backdrop of hanging Greek flags, March 2017. Austerity measures
left thousands of businesses shuttered across the country.
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Austerity: When It Works and When It Doesn’t
By Alberto Alesina, Carlo Favero, and Francesco Giavazzi
Princeton University Press
A decade ago, Alberto Alesina was one of the most influential economists in
the world. His theory of “expansionary austerity”—the paradoxical notion
that reducing public expenditure would lead to an increase in economic
activity—was one of the hottest ideas in macroeconomics. He claimed to
have shown that government surpluses could actually boost growth, but
only if they were achieved via spending cuts rather than tax increases. At a
moment when many governments were seeking Keynesian remedies to a
global recession, his work (along with fellow Harvard economist Silvia
Ardagna) reassured conservatives that there was no conflict between
keeping up demand in a crisis and the longer-term goal of reining in the
public sector. Not surprisingly, his ideas were taken up by right-wing
politicians both in Europe and in the U.S., where he was widely cited by the
Republicans who took control of the House in 2010. Along with the work of
Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff on the supposed dangers of excessive
government debt, Alesina’s work provided one of the key intellectual props
for the shift among elite policymakers toward fiscal consolidation and
austerity.
Right from the outset, other economists pointed to serious flaws in the case
for expansionary austerity, and challenged almost every aspect of the
statistical exercises underlying it. A partial list of criticisms includes: using
inappropriate measures of fiscal balance; misapplying lessons from boom
times to periods of crisis; misclassifying episodes of fiscal expansion as
austerity; and generalizing from the special conditions of small open
economies, where exchange rate moves could cushion the effects of
austerity. The central claim—that austerity based on spending cuts worked
better than tax-based austerity—was effectively debunked.
In 2009, Alesina suggested that Europe was likely to see faster growth
because it was cutting public spending in response to the crisis, while the
U.S. had embraced conventional Keynesian stimulus. But while the U.S.
recovery was weak, in Europe there was hardly any recovery at all. In the
countries that cut public spending the most, such as Spain, Portugal, and
Ireland, GDP remained below its 2008 peak four, five, even six years after
the crisis. By 2013, the financial journalist Jim Tankersley could offer an
unequivocal verdict: “No advanced economy has proved Alesina correct in
the wake of the Great Recession.”
Macroeconomic debates have moved on since then. A large new empirical
literature on fiscal policy has emerged over the past decade, the great
majority of it confirming the old Keynesian wisdom that in a depressed
economy, increased public spending can raise output by perhaps $1.50 for
each dollar spent. New questions have been raised about central banks’
ability to stabilize the economy, whether with conventional monetary
policy or with new tools like forward guidance and quantitative easing. The
seemingly permanent reality of low interest rates has changed the debate
over the sustainability of government finances, with prominent
mainstream economists suggesting that public debt no longer poses the
dangers it was once thought to. The revived idea of secular stagnation has
suggested that economic stimulus may not be a problem for occasional
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downturns, but an ongoing necessity. And the urgency of climate change
has created big new tasks for the public sector.
It’s a very different conversation from a decade ago. Can Alesina’s ideas
adapt to this new environment?
That’s the challenge for his new book, Austerity: When It Works and When It
Doesn’t, which brings together work on government budgets that goes back
now almost three decades. Through the years, Alesina has had a rotating
cast of co-authors, often from Bocconi University; this book is co-authored
with Carlo Favero and Francesco Giavazzi, both professors there. Given how
the book has been advertised and promoted (“towering,” a “counterblast”),
one might expect a thorough response to the new arguments that have
developed over the past decade about aggregate demand management and
the appropriate size of the public sector, not to mention the failure of
Alesina’s past predictions.
Disappointingly, this is not the case. There has been no marking of beliefs
to market. For the most part, the book restates the same arguments that
were made a decade ago: Countries with high public debt must adopt
austerity, and this will not hurt growth if it takes the form of spending cuts
rather than tax increases. Alesina et al. do make some effort to respond to
specific methodological criticisms of the earlier work. But they don’t
engage with—or even acknowledge—the larger shifts in the landscape.
Tellingly, all the book’s formal analysis and almost all of its text (as well as
the online data appendix) stop in 2014. For what is supposed to be a
definitive statement, it’s an odd choice. Why ignore everything we might
learn about austerity and government budgets over the past five years? The
book also operates at an odd mix of registers, which makes it hard to
understand who the audience is. Exoteric chapters seemingly intended for
a broad readership are interspersed with math-heavy esoteric chapters that
will be read only by professional economists. You get the feeling this is
mostly material that sat in a drawer for a long time before being fished out
and stapled together into a book.
To be fair, there are some advances from the previous iterations. Instead of
relying on purely statistical measures of association between fiscal
positions and growth, the book offers some case studies, and makes use of
a “narrative” approach in which periods of austerity are defined by the
stated intentions of policymakers and not just by changes in the budget.
But this is no substitute for a real historical analysis, and the great bulk of
the argument is still based on statistical exercises.
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Those who are not convinced by the econometrics in Alesina’s earlier work
will not be convinced here either. Even people who share the authors’
commitment to rolling back the public sector will soon suspect that they
are in the presence of what is politely called motivated reasoning.
For Alesina and colleagues, austerity episodes almost always reflect
countries persistently spending beyond their means, with debt rising until
a tipping point is reached. But in Europe—surely ground zero in any
discussion of contemporary austerity—this story lacks even superficial
plausibility. On the eve of their crises, Ireland, Spain, and even Portugal
had debt/GDP ratios below that of unscathed France; Spain and Ireland
were well below Germany. (The fact that Germany consistently ran large
deficits in the decade before the crisis is not mentioned.) Indeed, until 2011
Ireland, now an austerity poster child, had the lowest debt ratio of any
major Western European country.
The crisis came first, then the turn to austerity; big deficits were a response
to the downturn, not precursors to it; the rising debt ratios came last,
driven mainly by falling GDP. Even Greece, perhaps the one country where
public finances were a genuine problem before the crisis, is a case in point:
From 2010 to 2015, deep cutbacks in public services successfully reduced
public debt by about 15 billion euros, or 5 percent—but the debt/GDP ratio
still rose by 30 points, thanks to a collapse in GDP.
It would be easy to debate the book point by point. But it’s more useful to
take a step back and think about the larger argument. While the book shifts
erratically in tone and subject, underlying all of its arguments—and the
larger pro-austerity case—is a rigid logical skeleton. First, a government’s
fiscal balance (surplus or deficit) over time determines its debt/GDP ratio.
If a country has a high debt to GDP, that is “almost always … the result of
overspending relative to tax revenues.” Second, the debt ratio leads to
market confidence in the government’s debt; private investors do not want
to buy the debt of a country that has already issued too much. Third, the
state of market confidence determines the interest rate the government
faces, or whether it can borrow at all. Fourth, there is a clear line where
high debt and high interest rates make debt unsustainable; austerity is the
unavoidable requirement once that line is passed. And finally, when
austerity restores debt sustainability, that contributes to economic growth,
especially if the austerity involves spending cuts.
If you accept the premises, the conclusions follow logically. Even better,
they offer the satisfying spectacle of public-sector hubris meeting its
nemesis. But real-world debt dynamics don’t run along such well-oiled
tracks.
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First of all, as a historical matter, differences in growth, inflation, and
interest rates are at least as important as the fiscal position in determining
the evolution of the debt ratio over time. Where debt is already high,
moderately slower growth or higher interest rates can easily raise the debt
ratio faster than even very large surpluses can reduce it—as many countries
subject to austerity have discovered. Conversely, rapid economic growth
and low interest rates can lead to very large reductions in the debt ratio
without the government ever running surpluses, as in the U.S. and U.K.
after World War II. More recently, Ireland reduced its debt/GDP ratio by 20
points in just five years in the mid-1990s while continuing to run
substantial deficits, thanks to the very fast growth of the “Celtic Tiger”
period. In situations like the European crisis, extraordinary actions like
public assumptions of private debt or writedowns by creditors (as in
Cyprus and Greece) can also produce large changes in the stock of debt,
without any changes in spending or taxes. Ireland again is an example: The
decision to assume the liabilities of private banks catapulted its debt/GDP
ratio from 27 percent to over 100 percent practically overnight. Cases like
this make a mockery of the book’s claim that a country’s debt burden
reliably reflects its past fiscal choices.
At the second step, market demand for government debt clearly is not an
“objective” assessment of the fiscal position, but reflects crowd psychology,
self-confirming conventional expectations, and all the other pathologies of
speculative markets. The claim that interest rates reflect the soundness or
otherwise of public budgets runs up against a glaring problem: The
financial markets that recoil from a country’s bonds one day were usually
buying them eagerly the day before. The same markets that sent interest
rates on Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek bonds soaring in 2010 were the
ones snapping up their public and private debt at rock-bottom rates in the
mid-2000s. And they’re the same markets that are setting interest rates for
those countries at historical low levels today (Greece now pays less to
borrow than the U.S.!), even as their debt ratios, in many cases, remain
extremely high. Alesina and colleagues get hopelessly tangled on this point.
They want to insist both that post-crisis interest rates reflect the true state
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Londoners demonstrate against the British government’s austerity measures,
April 2016.
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of public finances, and that the low rates before the crisis were the result of
a speculative bubble. But they can’t have it both ways: If low rates in 2005
were not a sign that the state of public finances was sound, then high rates
in 2010 can’t be a sign that they were unsound.
If the authors had extended their analysis significantly beyond 2014, this
problem would only have gotten worse. What’s really striking about
interest rates in Europe in recent years is how uniformly they have
declined. Ireland, which has managed to reduce its debt ratio by 50 points
since 2010, today borrows at less than 1 percent. But so does Spain, whose
debt ratio increased by almost 40 points over the same period. The claim
that interest rates are mainly a function of a country’s fiscal position just
doesn’t fit the historical experience. It’s hard to exaggerate how critical this
is for the whole argument. Rising interest rates are the only cost ever
mentioned for high debt, and hence the only reason for austerity; and
reducing interest costs is the only intelligible mechanism on offer for the
supposed growth-boosting effects of austerity—vague invocations of
“confidence” don’t count.
And this brings us to the third step. One of the clearest macroeconomic
lessons of the past decade is that market confidence doesn’t matter: A
determined central bank can set interest rates on public borrowing at
whatever level it chooses. In the years before 2007, there were endless
warnings that if the U.S. did not get its fiscal house in order, it would be
faced with rising interest rates, a flight from the dollar, and eventually the
prospect of default. (In 2005, Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser were bold
enough to predict that unsustainable deficits would lead to a collapse in the
dollar within the next two years.) Today, with the debt ratio much higher
than even the pessimistic forecasts of that period, the federal government
borrows more cheaply than ever. And there hasn’t been even a hint of the
Fed losing control of interest rates. Similar stories apply around the world.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of central banks’ power over financial
markets came in 2011–2012, when a series of interventions by the
European Central Bank—culminating in Mario Draghi’s famous “whatever
it takes” moment—stopped the sharp spike in southern European interest
rates in its tracks. With an implicit guarantee from their central banks—
which other developed countries like the U.S. and U.K. also enjoy—
governments simply don’t need to worry about losing access to credit. To
the extent that governments like Greece remained locked out of the
markets after Draghi’s announcement, this was a policy choice by the ECB,
not a market outcome.
If countries can face financial crises even when their debt ratio is low, and
can enjoy ultra-low interest rates even when they are high, then it’s hard to
see why the debt ratio should be a major object of policy. Alesina’s central
question—whether expenditure-based or tax-based austerity is better for
growth—is irrelevant, since there’s no good reason for austerity at all.
In a world of chronically low interest rates and active central banks,
government debt just isn’t a problem. At one point, this was a fringe
In a world of chronically low interest rates
and active central banks, government debt
just isn’t a problem.
“
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position, but today it’s been accepted by economists with as impeccable
mainstream credentials as Olivier Blanchard, Lawrence Summers, and
Jason Furman—the former chief economist of the IMF, Treasury secretary,
and chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, respectively. But not by
Alesina and colleagues, who just go on singing their same old songs.
“Sound finance” is no longer the pillar of elite opinion it once was. As we
write this, Christine Lagarde, the new head of the European Central Bank,
is calling for European governments to spend more during downturns—
something hard to imagine when Alesina’s ideas were in vogue. In the U.S.,
meanwhile, concerns about the federal debt seem almost passé.
This is progress, from our point of view. The intellectual case for austerity
has collapsed, and this book will do little to rebuild it. But that has not yet
led to an expansion of public spending—let alone one large enough to
restore genuine full employment and meet the challenge of climate change
and other urgent social needs. The austerity machinery of the euro system
and IMF still churns away, grinding out misery and unemployment across
southern Europe and elsewhere, even if it no longer commands the general
assent that it once did. At the level of ideas, Keynesian economists can
point to real gains in the decade since the crisis. At the level of concrete
policy, the work has barely begun.
